

Address by

Lt. General Vernon A. Walters

to

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

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I'd just like to say, first of all, a few words about what is intelligence. Intelligence is information that is vital to the making of sound decisions by our Government, informations concerning foreign countries and information concerning the policies of foreign countries, concerning the armament of foreign countries, concerning the economics of foreign countries that must be properly analyzed and must be properly disseminated.

For instance, a lot of intelligence, if you don't get it out in time, is simply history. It is not intelligence unless you get it to whoever needs it right away. Why do you need it? Why do we need it today?

Well, we need it today because, in my opinion, the United States is in a tougher power situation than it has been since Valley Forge. Not since Valley Forge has any foreign country had the ability to destroy or seriously cripple the United States. That capability exists today.

We all know that detente is, we hope, something that will work and will serve to lessen tensions between the countries. But at the same time as detente, we can't help seeing the Soviet Union deploying four new different types of ICBMs, signs of a fifth on the horizon. They're third generation misssiles, they're not anything they've just cooked up. We see them building larger and more powerful submarines. We see them increasing the number of tanks and modernizing

the tanks in the Soviet rifle divisions.

We see, in other words, in all areas a tremendous military effort being made to modernize and improve the Soviet forces beyond what seems to me to be necessary for either deterrence or defense. And so the inevitable question which faces the United States Government is: What use will they make of this, of these capabilities? And that is a question for which the United States Government must look to the intelligence community, to the CIA and the other intelligence agencies, for answers.

Now, one of the problems we have today is that there is a great effort abroad to make you believe that intelligence is immoral, un-American, unworthy and everything else, and that everybody should know all the secrets that are running around, and that the Founding Fathers would have frowned on all of this dirty stuff that's going on.

Well, let me tell you a few things about the Founding Fathers. George Washington wrote a letter to his chief of intelligence in New Jersey, Col. Elias Dayton, and this is what he said: "The need for procuring good intelligence is so obvious that it need not be emphasized. All that remains for me is to caution you that secrecy is essential in these matters, and for lack of it they generally fail no matter how favorable the outcome."

So clearly, George Washington did not believe that pub-

lishing all the news concerning intelligence or the secrets of the United States was necessary.

And I come down to a much closer time, to President Truman. In 1956, he was asked about this and this may seem harsh to you -- a lot of you from the media -- but he said: "It matters not to the United States whether its secrets become known through publication in the media or through the activity of spies. The damage to the United States is the same in both cases." And he added: "I, for one, do not believe that the best interest^s of our country ^{ARE} is served by going on the principle that everybody has the right to know everything."

And that extends across a long period of American history. So the idea that this is immoral or wrong is simply not an actual fact if you look at American history. However, I want to say something more about that.

But right now we're engaged in a number of inquiries to determine whether any great nation can operate its secret intelligence service, so to speak, in a goldfish bowl. Now, we may succeed because we are a very unusual people. But if we do, it'll be just like going to the moon. We'll have been the only ones who ever succeeded in doing it.

Now, I think these investigations can be healthy, they can be helpful to us in the future, providing they are

WALTERS - 4

conducted in a positive, constructive and responsible sense and are not operated as some sort of a political football, because the security of the United States is far too precious to be kicked around as a football.

We are quite prepared to accept any guidelines which the Congress may decide to put upon us. We could live with those guidelines as we've lived with the guidelines they gave us in the past. But I would hope that when they institute these guidelines, they institute some mechanism to change them so that as perceptions of what is acceptable and unacceptable change, that will be introduced in some way into the guidelines.

You could have run in 1935, in some parts of the country, a segregated school. You cannot in 1975. In 1925, you'd have probably been in trouble if you tried to operate anything but a segregated school. So these perceptions of what is right and wrong change with the passage of time. And we hope that whatever the Congress does in its wisdom to provide us with guidelines at the end, will provide us with a mechanism to change these guidelines as we go along.

Now, we are being called-up and investigated for the things we did, or alleged to have done. What I fear is that in 1990 or 1985, Mr. Colby's distant successor will be summoned and he will be investigated for what he failed to do. "You mean you weren't doing this? You mean you didn't do that?"

WALTERS - 5

You mean you failed to do this?"

So however this works out, I hope that these guidelines which we will get in the end from the Congress, will contain some mechanism for interpreting to us the changing perceptions of the American people on different things.

Again, I go back to the perception of what was right and wrong. Now, I was doing a little research on intelligence in connection with the Bicentennial year, and I discovered that George Washington operated three separate kidnap attempts on Benedict Arnold. And you can guess what he'd have done with him if ^{he} got him.

For three years, from 1772 to 1775, prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, Benjamin Franklin, as Assistant Postmaster of the Colonies, was running a mail-intercept service on the British.

George Washington had a listening post operating next to British headquarters in Philadelphia, by a lady. George Washington had people right outside Jersey City who would interrogate the travelers who were going into New York City occupied by the British and coming out again.

As a matter of fact, as far back as the Revolution, there was a fort which was dedicated to intelligence activity, but I blush to tell you the name of the fort. ~~It~~ was known as Fort Looney.

Again, I get back to this question of the perception of

WALTERS - 6

what is wrong. You've all heard about the story of assassinations, and on assassinations I would simply like to say that I agree fully with the position that Director Colby has taken; that it is not in the interest of the United States to have the Agency point the finger at anybody inside or outside the Agency in this connection.

I would say that in connection with -- Mr. Castro was one of the people who was discussed a great deal. And I wasn't with the CIA in those days, and as a matter of fact, I accompanied him for three days ^(ON A TOUR) that he was making here around the United States. But shortly before that, he had been shooting people every day in front of the television cameras in the national stadium in Havana. And people were quite agitated ^{AT} to him.

Not long ago, somebody I know said to a distinguished member of the Congress that if anybody had been able to assassinate Hitler during the War they would have probably been the first recipient of the Victoria Cross and the Congressional Medal of Honor. And the guy said, "Yes, but if they could've gotten him in '35 or '36, think of how many lives you'd have saved."

So you've got a question of the perception. We weren't at war with Germany in 1935 or '36. We would have had no justification for taking any action against him. But that it depends on the way people look at these things.

WALTERS - 7

Now, one of the problems we have is that, in connection with all of this publicity, is that ~~there are a large~~ number of people who want to believe that America is always wrong. ^{What} I call "the America-is-wrongers." Someone said to me the other day, "Don't you think that some of these things that were done against us, were done as retaliation for what the United States did?"

Well, I said if you take the vision of the United States as an aggressive, imperialist, hostile nation, perhaps you can rationalize this. But if you look at the United States, which has fought and won two great wars in this century, and not only took nothing from the vanquished but helped the vanquished. No victor in history has ever done for the vanquished what we have done.

If today Volkswagon^E is selling cars in the United States, it is because we as a people put machine tools in that factory at ^{WOLFESBURG} right after the War. And that's true of Fiat, or anybody else.

I submit that the United States has done something no country in history has ever done. It has financed its competitors back into business sooner, ^{Back} into competition with it. And if that is the action of a hostile, aggressive, threatening nation, words have a funny meaning.

Now, as I say, we have this problem of America is always wrong. We also tend to have this somewhat puritanical view

WALTERS - 8

of ourselves as being better than other people. And we say, "Oh, yes, that espionage is all right for the dirty old British, French, Russians, Germans or someone else. But we Americans are pure. We don't do that sort of thing." Well, unfortunately we are not that much better than everybody else, and if you look at our crime statistics, they will tell you that we are not in a position to assume such a holier-than-thou attitude.

Not long ago I was in Europe and I was told a story which I think is very illustrative. It was told to me before the Mayaguez incident. This man said to me, "Did you hear the story of the Frenchman, the Englishman and the American who were captured by the cannibals on a desert island?"

And I said, "No, what is it?"

And he said, "Well, the cannibals in an island in the Pacific captured a Frenchman, and Englishman and an American. And the cannibal chief told them they were to be eaten for lunch the next day, but he would give them each one wish, which did not include setting them free, before he did this.

"So he said to the Frenchman, 'What do you want?'

"The Frenchman said, 'Well, if I'm going to be killed tomorrow morning I guess I'd just as soon spend the remaining time with the beautiful cannibal girl over there.'

"So they said O.K., and they untied him and he and the cannibal girl went off in the woods.

"Then they said to the Englishman, 'What do you want?'

"He said, 'I want a pen and paper to write a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations and protest against the unfair, unjust and unsporting attitude you have demonstrated toward us.'

"So they untied the Englishman and they led him into a hut and they gave him a pen and a paper.

"Then they said to the American, 'What do you want?'

"And the American said, 'I want to be lead into the middle of the village, I want to be made to kneel down and I want the biggest cannibal here to kick me in the behind.'

"And they said, 'Well, that's an odd request but the Americans are odd people and we did promise, so O.K.'

"So they lead the American into the middle of the field, into the middle of the square. They made him kneel down, they untied him, the biggest cannibal gave him a kick and knocked him sprawling. Now the American had been hiding a submachine gun under his clothes. So at this point he pulled out the submachine gun and he cut down the cannibals. Well, the rest of them fled, and the Frenchman, hearing the gunfire, came out of the woods and the Englishman, hearing the gunfire, came out of the hut and they looked at the American and they said, 'Do you mean to say you had that submachine gun the whole time?'

"The American said, 'Sure.'

"And they said, 'Well, why the heck didn't you use it

WALTERS - 10

before now?'

"And the American looked at them, and very earnestly he said, 'But you don't understand. It wasn't until they kicked me in the rear end that I had any moral justification for it.'"

So this is a little bit one of our problems, too.

Again, another foreigner said to me the other day, he said, "Don't you have a law against indecent exposure in the United States, against taking off your clothes in public?"

I said, "We certainly do."

Well, he said, "Will you explain to me why you practice internationally what you prohibit domestically?"

One of the things that America has brought to intelligence, in my opinion, it's brought two great things: It's brought the application of American technology and scientific know-how to the collection of intelligence. And it's brought analysis of that intelligence to a degree that has not been known in previous intelligence services.

And I think one of the interesting things in our intelligence studies as they go forward is if there are dissenting views they are expressed, and the reasoning behind them is expressed, which I think is a somewhat new factor. I think we have brought this to intelligence and we have made intelligence a force not just for war, as in the past, but for peace.

I was present as General Eisenhower's interpreter at the

WALTERS - 11

'53 conference in Geneva. And he made the Open Skies Proposal whereby each country would overfly the others and see what they were doing. And the Russians refused that as a ground that it would violate their sovereignty. And I'll never forget General Eisenhower wound up with a very eloquent speech, held his hands up to heaven and said, "I wish God would give me some means of convincing you of my sincerity." And there was a loud clap of thunder and every light in the building went out. And to this day, the Russian technicians are still trying to figure out how we did it.

But we had great talk 15-20 years ago about a missile gap. We can't have that talk anymore, thanks to intelligence we know what the situation is.

And you know one of the things that engenders hostility and eccentric and erratic action is fear of the unknown. And when you know what the situation is, you're a lot better off. I can't go into details, but I can tell you that we in the Central Intelligence Agency have several times brought together people ^{FROM} of different countries that looked as if they were nearer at the edge of conflict, and been in some part instrumental in resolving that.

Or sometimes someone has said to us, "Oh, so-and-so is going to do such-and-such to us."

And we said, "No they aren't. We know they aren't because

WALTERS - 12

they haven't got the means to do it."

Now, you know, you just have to take me on faith. There's no way I can tell you who was involved or anything else because it would be extremely embarrassing to them and to us. But intelligence, believe me, is a force for peace as well as for war. It is a force to guard us against surprise. And it is also a force to dissipate misunderstandings or, as I say, fear of the unknown, which is one of the things that pushes people to do eccentric things.

Now, I've been at the agency for three and a half years. People often ask me what I feel about it and all I can tell you is that I never cease to be startled at the competence, at the integrity, at the continuity, and most of all at the dedication of the people there. They're Americans just like everybody else in this room, they want to live in an American society according to the rules that the American people establish. But they must know what the American people are willing to accept as rules and want us to do.

Now, the Congress set up the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 with the full knowledge that it was going to engage in espionage. And they left the charge deliberately vague: "And do such other things as the National Security Council may direct."

As I've told you we can live with any kind of oversight. We have never had a leak out of our oversight committees.

WALTER - 13

We tell them anything they want to know. And we can live with whatever form, out of the present investigations, whatever form of oversight the Congress comes up with we feel confident we can live with.

What I feel personally less confident is that we will get any clear guidelines as to what we can do and what we can't do. I think that's going to be an extremely difficult thing to get.

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And finally, I would like to say one word about the people of the Central Intelligence Agency, and that is simply that, as I say, I've been struck by these people. Here they are under a torrent of accusation and mud and innuendo and continuing to do a ^{As} superb job in producing what I believe to be the finest intelligence put before any government ^{of} the world every morning.

People sometimes forget that people in intelligence have rights, too. They have the right to the same presumption of innocence as any other American citizen. The accusation comes, and the rebuttal never catches up. The news about Mr. Butterfield being a CIA infiltrator of the White House covered seven-column headline. The news that he wasn't: one column.

A man by the name of Sturgis went on the television and said he was an employe of the CIA and had organized some plot against Castro. We called the director of that program and told him that a careful search of our files revealed that man had never at any time ever been a member of the CIA, or worked for it in any form. He was introduced on the program as a former member of the CIA. There's just no way you can catch up with that kind of thing. I don't say this in any complaining aspect. I just say it on behalf of the thousands of people who are serving the United States in a very difficult way.

WALTERS - 15

I've been in the army. It's much easier to serve in the army. You live openly, everybody knows what you are and everything else. The life of the people in the Central Intelligence Agency is more difficult. I'm not asking for any special privilege for them, but I'm asking for at least the same rights as other American citizens enjoy.

This whole question of intelligence, as I said, is a very serious matter. The survival of the United States as a free and democratic society may well depend upon it. We have been spending enormous amounts of time rummaging through the garbage pails of history looking at the '50s and the '60s. The question of whether we're going to continue as a free and democratic nation is going to be decided in the late '70s and early '80s. And I just hope that sometime we begin to spend appropriate time on that period, which is going to determine how we and our children are going to live in the future.

I would like to say one word about our director, Mr. Colby: I rarely find myself in agreement with the Chinese Communists, but they have a song that says, "Sailing depends upon the helmsman," and we have a superb one.

Many people felt Mr. Colby should have been more aggressive or more penitential. I think Mr. Colby has established a credibility with the congressional committees that enables him to make sure that the good secrets are kept secret. I

WALTERS - 16

think he has established a reputation with them for frankness, for openness and for reliability. I think he has steered the only course that could hold the Agency together and gain the respect of the committee so that we could have an objective and a dispassionate investigation.

And I must say that I consider him one of the most remarkable human beings I have ever known. I once said that the next time I go to Rome, I'm going to the Vatican to see what I could do about obtaining the first beatification process for anybody still alive. How this man stands this, I do not know, and he stands it without passing on any of the strain. Whatever there is, he absorbs himself -- he doesn't pass it on to me or any other of his subordinates. But I just think that we are very fortunate, indeed, to have such a pilot while we're passing through this squall.

One more word: As I say, one of the difficulties is that many people would want us to operate our intelligence not just by standards acceptable to the American people, but with a degree of purity that we can be sure will not be reciprocated. And if you're fighting someone with brass knuckles, and you're required to fight according to the Marquis of Queensbury rules, you're going to have quite a difficult time, to put it mildly.

Finally, I would just like to say that, every day when I go to work, I find a memory of something that is not our

WALTERS - 17

American choice, And that is the fact that we must fight on the silent intelligence battlefield. As I go into the building, I see the stars carved in the wall of the Central Intelligence Agency who symbolize the people, the members of that Agency, who have fallen in the service of the United States -- unhonored, unknown by most, but nevertheless just as truly as anybody who died anywhere else that you and I might continue to live free.

And on the other side of the entrance is carved the motto of the Agency, which is a Biblical quote and says, "You shall know the truth and the truth will make you free." I can't help thinking that in our time, we perhaps ought to change that a little bit, irreverent as it might be, to, "You must know the truth, for only the knowledge of the truth will keep you free."

We face a different kind of problem in what faces the United States today. I would just like to read to you a couple of sentences from a Chinese writer who wrote 500 years before Christ. He wrote a book called The Art of War, and he described how you undo your enemies. And this is what he said:

"The most consummate art is to subdue your enemies without having to fight them on the battlefield. The direct method of war is necessary only on the battlefield, but it is only the indirect methods that lead to true victory and its con-

WALTERS - 18

solidation."

And this is the advice he gives you of how you undo your enemies. And if any of you find anything familiar about this, you're not wrong:

"Denigrate everything that is good in your opponent's country. Involve their leaders in criminal operations. Undermine them by every means and then expose them to the public scorn of their fellow citizens. Use the most execrable and vile individuals. Cause trouble by every means at hand within their government. Spread discord and quarrels amongst the citizens of the opposing country. Agitate the young against the old. Destroy by all means the weapons supply and discipline of your opponent. Cover with ridicule their old traditions and heritage. Be generous in your offers and rewards to purchase information or accomplices. Put secret agents everywhere. Never stint on money or promises, and thus you will reap a rich reward."

This is the new form of war with which we have to contend. It is not the old thing of divisions marching across the field. It is this type of thing which is the silent battlefield of which I speak.

We will do our best. We will conform to whatever standards are imposed upon us by the American people. And throughout the past, the United States intelligence community has tried to do what they could to keep the United States a free and

independent country. This is sometimes difficult, because we Americans have a tendency to disband our intelligence after wars or between wars.

In August, 1941, I was sent to the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp ^TRichie, and the commandant of that camp was a British colonel. In 1932, Mr. Stimson, when he was Secretary of State, was handed an intercepted message and he rejected it with horror, saying, "Gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail." ^{L.A. Sec. /} Seven years, as Secretary of War, he couldn't get his hands on enough other gentlemen's mail.

As I mentioned, perceptions change. We hope that as a result of these things, we will get guidelines, but guidelines that will contain the means of telling us when these perceptions change. And that we will not be judged on what we did in 1955 on the basis of 1975 standards or judged in 1990 on the basis of 1990 standards against what was done in 1976.

People have asked me whether I thought the Agency will survive this. I have no doubt. If the United States is to remain a free and independent country, it must have good intelligence. There is no alternative for us as a people.

(END ADDRESS)

Q&A FOLLOWING SPEECH BY VERNON WALTERS

(START OF SECOND SIDE)

... Details but I think the word "massive" is ~~the~~ completely out of place.

For instanc^Ne, let's get into one simple item: wiretaps. I believe we found that we conducted 32 wiretaps in 27 years. That's about $1\frac{1}{2}$ wiretaps a year. That may be massive by by somebody's standards, but it's not by mine.

In my opinion, you've got a number of isolated facts, some distortions, and you put them all together in a salad or in an omelet -- what should have been a salad if things were kept separately -- and he drew a conclusion which I still believe to be false.

Q General, right after the Watergate break-in, you tried to warn President Nixon what was really going on [] and you made some explosion. Can you tell us: Do you think the President really knew what was going on in Watergate?

A That's a domestic activity and, as you know, we're precluded from that. The only person I had access to was John Dean and I told him that.

Q You did not speak to the President?

A I did not speak to the President.

Q General, what was your reaction when you read the transcript of the President's conversations ~~made~~ ^{A FEW DAYS} after Watergate when he suggested to his subordinates that they should try to get the CIA involved in the cover-up?

WALTERS - 2

A I was surprised.

Q General, are you doing anything less now than you would have done before all this uproar? Has all this uproar reduced your activities?

A I would say, yes, it has. ^{A:} It has. There have been various things, you know, that have passed. For instance, there is a legislative proviso that we must report any political actions or covert actions to the Congress -- to the Foreign Relations or the Foreign Affairs Committees of the House.

We're an American organization living in the United States. The acceptance of such things is much less now than it used to be. We try and live according to the standards of what is acceptable to the American people. We do much less of this--I can't tell you we do none. I spoke a little while ago about analysis and technology and the overt collection of intelligence. But no technology, no system -- no technological system -- nothing overhead or underneath will get you into anybody's head or get you into the decision process. Only people can do that.

And if you get into the question of what is very popular ^{A:} now as cost effectiveness, a man can tell you something at infinitesimal cost which would cost you hundreds of millions of dollars to get through a technological system. So sometimes the human source is a very cost-effective one.

WALTERS - 3

Q General, could you give us your thoughts on why the perceptions have changed?

A Well, I think the perceptions have changed throughout American history. Mr. Lincoln, during the Copperhead riots, ordered the artillery to fire on the rioters in New York and I think there were about 1,100 people killed. If that were to happen today, everybody would be outraged. These things change.

Unless I'm mistaken, the Maryland Assembly was about to vote Maryland out of the Union and Mr. Lincoln sent federal troops over and closed the Maryland Assembly.

Now if those things were done today, they would be wrong. But in the perception of the threat to the Union which existed then, the threat to the very existence of the United States, they were conceived as acceptable.

You know when Mr. Scorzani was tried for kidnapping people in American uniforms, he summoned as witnesses two British officers. He said, "Did you ever wear a German uniform and operate behind the Allied lines?" They said, "Yes." He said, "The defense rests."

Q Are the Soviets violating the SALT agreements?

A I am not aware of ^{any} violation by the Soviets of the SALT agreements.

Q Are they cheating on the agreements rather than violating them?

WALTERS - 4

A I am not aware of any major cheating on the SALT agreements. I think the Soviets know, you know, and this is consecrated in the SALT agreements, that there are national technical means of verification.

Q Which they are interfering with, now, ~~APR 11, 1974~~?

A I do not think they are interfering that I know of. I think they have undertaken not to, as we have undertaken not to interfere with theirs, and I don't think they underestimate ours.

Q Have they violated the unilateral statements

A I don't want to get into the details of the unilateral statements but I do not believe that a unilateral statement made by either party was necessarily binding unless the other one issued a statement saying, "We accept this." Some they accepted, some they took note of and some they made no comment on.

Q Right, but in other words, in terms of actual unilateral understanding that we made, could you suggest how many of those were actually disregarded by --

A Well, some of them were changed from between one agreement and the other. I am not aware, to the best of my knowledge, of any major Soviet violation of any of the agreements they have undertaken in connection with the strategic arms limitation talks.

Q When I'm talking about unilateral understanding, I'm talking about the ~~actual number of~~ --

WALTERS - 5

A Well, I can only repeat what I say. I think if there had been any major violation, it would have come to my attention. I am not aware of one as of now.

Q General, why did you people fail back in the '60s to get rid of Castro? ^{Av}

A I wasn't there. I can't tell you.

Q What's your fifth ICBM that's showing up -- the fifth in the family?

A Well, they've got another system -- it's sort of a hodge-podge of some of the previously existing ones. It's a mixture of some of the other previously existing ones.

Q Does it have a number? Is it bigger, smaller?

A It's smaller.

Q General, to follow up on Vic Lasky's question about Castro: Do you have any personal feelings on that ~~point~~? What might have gone wrong with that operation and why it did not succeed?

A Well, it's difficult. There's no sight like hindsight. It's about a 20/5 eyesight. I don't know. I think it was a very difficult problem to do. Anybody who has lived in a totalitarian Communist society knows how difficult it is to operate in that kind of an environment.

I think a lot of ^{people} believe that Fidel was not really a Communist and he wasn't really going to set up that kind of a state and perhaps some of these things might be done.

WALTERS - 6

But when the Communists get into power and set up a real Communist state, it's quite difficult to operate in it.

Q Do you think in hindsight it was a worthy enterprise?

A That's an internal judgment which I would not want to pass at the present time. I'll just say this: I think at that time, it would have probably been acceptable to the American people. I'm not sure that it would today. And as I told you, we've got to operate within the framework of what we consider the American people by and ~~in~~ large will accept.

I personally would want to say one thing about assassination in general, and my own personal feeling, and I've said this to several people. Assassination is wrong because it's against the law of God, against the law of man, and it doesn't work. Bullets kill only men, never ideas. That's my own personal philosophy on it.

Q Would you have said the same thing about Adolf Hitler being bumped off?

A I think I would have said the same thing because I think Goering or some one else would have taken over with even greater fanaticism and it would have been rougher for the people that were in the power of the Nazis, and all in all for the world, it would not have made anything better. That could be argued with easily and other people could differ with it but that, I think, is probably -- I think

WALTERS - 7

someone like Goering would have taken over, he would have used that the way they used the assassination ^{of} Ernst Von Rath for the "Crystal Knight" to have some kind of a huge purge and pogrom. It would have more greatly fanaticized the people who were already fanaticized, and I don't think it would have been helpful to the world unless it could have been accompanied with a whole lot of other things that were not necessarily present.

Q General, does the KGB indulge in such --

A I don't know whether they do. They have in the past.

Q How would you compare you ^{R/}operation ^{S/}from theirs?

A Well, I don't personally know of any foreign leader that we have killed.

Q General, you said that we need a better mechanism for interpreting the ^{perceptions} ~~sections~~ of the American people. I thought we had one called the presidential election. How could we possibly have a better mechanism than we have where Congress says "the ~~Nation~~ CIA shall do such other things as the National Security Council shall order." And the President appoints all the members of the Council; In effect, he's the Commander ⁱⁿ Chief. Is there any way Congress could set up a committee for the conduct of intelligence?

A I think Congress can set up anything they want by legislation.

Q Do you think such a committee ^E would be helpful in inter-

preting this perception?

A Well, I think that intelligence -- the more people you have making decisions, the more difficult it is to arrive at a decision. But we can live, as I said, with anything the Congress sets up.

Q Isn't it true that the reason Congress wrote that thing in the first place -- "such other things as the National Security Council may direct" -- ^{is} simply their lawyerly recognition that they can't spell out what intelligence operations ought to be and do?

A Well, I was a very young captain at the time but my perception would not be terribly far from yours.

Q General, when you say you cut back on foreign covert operations, is that because of keeping a low profile right now with all the investigations, or is it a permanent thing brought on by the changed reporting? ^{People}

A I don't think there's anything permanent in intelligence. Intelligence depends a great deal on the sense of threat ^{People!} the American feel.

In 1955 and 1960, the American people felt very threatened. Now they don't.

Q Should they feel threatened?

A I would.

Q General, in that regard, I mean, talking about the missile buildup now, your intelligence does report on Soviet

WALTERS - 9

missile capability, for example. How would you regard this continual buildup -- as a violation of the spirit of SALT -- and do you think it should be regarded as an increasing threat and the American people should be made more aware of it, or what?

A SALT does not prohibit the qualitative improvement of existing systems. The Vladivostok Agreement limits us to a certain number. There has been no violation of that.

But on the other hand, there is nothing in the SALT agreements which prevents them from improving -- qualitatively -- what they have. And this is what they have been doing rather than violating in numbers.

Q General, would it be possible to separate the intelligence activities of the CIA from covert activities such as the Allende program? You said you were doing ~~your last~~ covert activity¹²⁵ now. Can intelligence survive without the international dirty tricks?

A Well, it depends what you consider dirty tricks. If you consider helping democratic forces to survive a hostile environment, I'm not sure ^{that} I would agree that's a dirty trick.

Q Where did that happen?

A That happened in Chile, specifically.

Q Where are the democratic forces in Chile today?

A They're not back yet.

WALTERS - 10

Q They sure aren't.

A No, but you know, one thing about rightist dictatorships that differs from Communist dictatorships is that, eventually, the rightist dictatorships fizzle out, and there is change^c and hope for change.

There is no case where the Communists have achieved power where they have ever transferred it by any means whatsoever with one single exception, and that is the Communist regime in Budapest in 1921 ~~was~~ was displaced by the arrival of Rumanian troops who occupied Budapest.

With a rightist dictatorship you may have to wait, but eventually, it's going to go. With a Communist dictatorship and the Brezhnev doctrine -- that the Soviet Union has the right to intervene to protect the achievements of the socialist regime -- there's not much hope for any transfer of power.

Q General, you said you would be irretrievably damaged then if you were put out of the business --

A I think the United States would be irretrievably damaged. The agency's future or existence is of small import. What is of import is the existence of the United States as a free and democratic society. And if the United States had no intelligence service, I would have serious doubts about its ability to survive as a free and democratic society.

Q Have you been badly hurt this year as a result of the

WALTERS - 11

publicity that's come out this year?

A I wouldn't say we've been badly hurt. In fact, I marvel at how relatively little, but yes, we have been hurt.

People that used to give us whole reports are giving us summaries, and people who used to give us summaries are now shaking hands with us. And people who used to voluntarily help ~~our side out~~ ^{US SAY} -- "Ah, don't come near me." This, I'm sure, must be a delight to the American "wrongers." But to the people who believe ^{that} ~~in~~ the United States represents the best hope of mankind for freedom in the world, it is not an encouraging factor.

Q General, you quoted the truth: "You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." I wonder if one of the problems has not been that the CIA has kept the information that it's had so much to itself that the American people have not been very well informed. I'm thinking specifically now of what is going on in Portugal. There seems to be a good deal of confusion about how much the Soviets -- the KGB -- is putting into Portugal. I've heard as much as 10 million dollars a month which rather dwarfs the 8 million dollars that the CIA put into Chile.

A During the Allende regime, the Eastern European countries put in 300 million dollars.

Q Do you know or does the CIA know how much the Soviets are putting into Portugal and why isn't this type of information

mation made known so that people understand what is going on in the world?

A Well, I think you must differentiate between ^(a)public relations group and an intelligence society. We are not in existence to influence American opinion. We are there to serve the elected officials who have been chosen by the United States Government. We tell the Congress. We tell the President. If they choose to reveal it to the American people, that's their right. But we do not feel that we should use our intelligence to sway American public opinion one way or the other. We are not a policy-making agency. That is up to our masters. If they wish to make that information public, if the Congress wishes to make it public, they can. We brief them, we tell them everything we know.

Q Who do we go to ^{to --} ~~A~~ direction to the CIA to say, "Tell us what was going on in Chile under the Allende regime as our agents know it and reported it"?

A I'm not sure I understand the question.

Q Who do we go to get the story on --

A Who do you, the press?

Q Yes.

A I would guess that's a decision to be made by the President or the Secretary of State or some other duly constituted authority.

Q Yes, but he says, "Well, I ^{ve} got the story here. It's

CIA but it's classified, secret or top secret. It's up to CIA, they put the classification on it."

A Well, there's no classification that CIA puts on that can't be taken off by proper authority.

Q Is the CIA still involved in testing of drugs in Maryland or other places?

A I don't believe so. If they are, they're crazy.

Q Going back to the assassinations without getting into the specifics, would it be a correct thing to assume that when the CIA decided on bumping off Mr. "X" --

A I don't think there's any indication that CIA ^{ever} decided any such thing.

Q The point is, was the White House the one that you people had to go to or was the White House the one --

A I know what you're driving at and I can't answer the question other than to repeat what Colby said -- that he does not believe that it is in the interest of the United States for us in the agency to point the finger at anybody inside or outside the agency.

Q Yes, but they pointed ^{the} finger at you -- Mr. Church, Senator Church said that you people were acting like rogue elephants. You're roaming around on your own. That would mean that you made the decisions. Was that true or wasn't that true.

A That is attempting to get the agency into an internal ~~American~~

(political
American/fight. And I don't believe that the interests
of the United States -- I said, if you recall at the time
of the Watergate -- that the strength of the agency lay in
its being apolitical. And I can't really take a position
saying some Senator is saying the truth or the falsehood,
or the President or anybody else. It would be unseemly
for me, as an appointee of the executive branch and as the
person who is responsible to the Congress, to start pointing
fingers of accusation at someone. The answer to that
question you're going to have to get somewhere else. I
just can't --

Q General, why did the CIA get into the experimentation
with LSD when the Army Warfare Service was working on it
as part ~~as part~~ of ?

A Well, this occurred, as you know, 24 years ago. I would
say -- I was not present at the time and I have no direct
personal knowledge of it -- that what ^{I had} / immensely impressed
the American people about this time / was the behavior of
the American prisoners in Korea -- the turncoats who had
elected to stay and denounce the United States. Americans
had never faced this problem. These were the first America
"wrongers" who showed up -- and they've unfortunately grown
greatly in numbers since.

We were baffled. We figured there must be some means

WALTERS - 15

by which they do this. They must be hypnotizing them or drugging them. Then we had Cardinal Mindszenty who had been the soul of resistance against the Nazis, and initially against the Communists, and here is this man with this haunted look -- and any of you who ever saw that picture of the man's face, beating his breast and accusing himself of every crime in the book. We felt this was a weapon that was going to be used against us and we were seeking -- and this is my perception, as I say, I have no direct personal knowledge. This is what the American people were ^Pappalled by, they were frightened by. There was wide acceptance for it, as you know from the newspapers -- I'm not pointing the finger at anybody -- but the agency was by no means the only person engaged in this.

Some of our remarkable institutions of learning and other things were also participating without any sense of real horror. And this is a perfect illustration of what I mean about the changes of perception of what is right and wrong over the passage of time.

Q General, would you rate the backfire ^{AS AIL} intercontinental brouhaha?

A Are you from "Aviation Weekly"? Some people do, some people don't. It's a matter of interpretation. It is theoretically capable of a one-way operation against the United States or a refueled operation against the United

States, it is not capable of a nonone-way, nonrefueled operation against the United States. And not being able to get into the head of the Soviet leaders and decide whether they were going to order these crews to commit, to perform, one-way missions, I find it impossible to answer that question with any degree of certainty.

Q General, let me ask you about Portugal again: Mr. Irvine mentioned that he had heard estimates from the CIA of 10 million dollars --

Mr. Irvine: No, not from the CIA, from the West.

Q Senator Bentsen has ~~has~~ made the statement then that he had heard from the CIA that as much as 10 million dollars a month was going into Portugal from the Soviet Union. Is that correct or could you tell us --

A Well, I'm sure if Senator Bentsen said it -- if he did talk to someone that said it -- far be it from me to suspect a United States Senator of not telling the truth.

I think it is extremely difficult -- I know what you're driving at -- but it's very hard to get a flat answer to that.

Q Can you give us any estimate though?

A I would estimate -- and I'm estimating -- that that is not out of the ballpark. They're doing it with cash and that's very hard to keep track of.

Q Unless ~~we~~ ^{watch} through Mexico.

WALTERS - 17

A That's checks.

STAT

Q Maybe you can get Senator Ervin to work on that.



Q Mr. Walters, in your agency's assessments of the threats to world peace, where do you rate Alexandr Solzhenitsyn?

Do you ^{AGREE with} ~~believe that~~ the advice that the President got that he ought not to have met with Mr. Solzhenitsyn because the meeting would have damaged detente -- whatever detente is?

A Well, I would presume that the advice that he got came from some part of the National Security Council, since they

WALTERS - 18

were appointed by him. I would find it difficult to ^{decide} agree with my bosses on anything like that.

I don't know. It's a very complex question and I don't know whether you'll know the answer until a couple of years from now one way or the ^{other} other.

One of the things that I'd like to say a word about -- one of the things that bothers me a little bit -- is that I think the person of the President, he is the head of the political party, he is the ruler and everything else, but there should be a certain restraint in handling -- there's so much responsibility on the man's shoulders, it is an awkward situation that he is so many things at once -- the head of the party, the ceremonial chief of state, the head of ^{the} Government and the head of the Administration. And I think that efforts to nail the President down with everything to get him to certify this, that or the other, to put his responsibility on the line is not really in the interest of the United States.

Q Then you think he should not have met --

A I did not pronounce myself one way or the other. That is really a domestic American issue as to what would happen in the United States, and it's a matter of domestic policy, and I think that for me, as an appointed official of the United States Government, to say I think the President was right or wrong, ^{would} again, be unseemly.

WALTERS - 19

Q Was it really a policy question whether or not he should have met Mr. Solzhenitsyn?

A No, I just think that for me as an appointed official by the President to publicly criticize the President would be unseemly.

Q Well then, you do disagree with him?

A No, I didn't say I did.

Q But you don't necessarily have to criticize him.

A No. I do not feel that it's appropriate for me to express an opinion on the decision of the President. Well, we can argue this one out. I think I've made my point.

Everybody would like me to get on ~~my~~ one side of a domestic argument and put the agency in domestic matters. I think the only way we can operate in the service of the American people is not get involved in political disputes within the United States. Everybody wants to sort of use us to back up their argument internally. I think if we do that we may derive some small, immediate advantage, but in the long term, I think it will harm the ability of the ^{agency} ~~United States~~ to give what it must.-- independent assessments to the properly constituted authorities.

Q Do you think that this investigation of the CIA and the seemingly concurrent ^{black out} ~~tangle~~ with the FBI is symptomatic of some kind of a conspiracy in the United States?

A I don't know about a conspiracy but I read you something from "Sun Sueng" ^{Tzu} that doesn't fit it very far off -- "Cover

WALTERS - 20

with ridicule everything that is valid in your oponent's country" and so forth.

Q Do you think it was ulterior then perhaps or --

A I think it's ulterior in some people, yes. I'm not saying it's ulterior in ~~some~~ ^{any} everybody. Certainly not, there are a lot of honest people who believe -- I want to make one thing quite plain. I'm not opposed to the congressional investigations, As I said, providing they're conducted in a responsible and positive and constructive fashion. I think they can be helpful. It's been 20 years since we had an investigation.

I might add, though, in the light of what the CIA is doing, the charge under which the CIA was operating following that last investigation, which concluded with something like this. It was the Dolittle investigation and I don't know when it was -- way back. But anyway, he said, "The United States is facing a ruthless and implacable enemy who is determined to destroy us by all means in their power. We must match their dedication with ours and their ruthlessness with ours." Again, that's the change of perception.

Q General, is that a correct assessment today? Are we facing that kind of enemy?

A Well, I think we're facing a very tough situation.

Q Are we facing that kind of an enemy today ~~is what~~ ^{As I said} he referred to?

WALTERS - 21

A Well, I think the tactics may have changed but I don't think the long-term goals have changed very much.

Q General, have you noticed any change since this so-called period of detente in intelligence or anything? Any change at all since this co-operation, so to speak?

A I don't think so.

Q How much better trained by the Russians?

A I don't believe there's any.

Q Never has been?

A I have no knowledge of any.

Q Are you concerned about the spying over at the embassy -- the big antenna, the stories they've had lately?

A That's an internal U.S. problem.

Q Are the Soviets making it more difficult for us now to obtain information on the ICBM firings than was the case at the time SALT was proposed? (Tape ends).

(END)